JUDICIAL REVIEW IN TIMES OF DEMOCRATIC CRISIS: THE ROLE OF THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT BETWEEN EXCEPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL NORMALITY

Abstract

The study examines the democratic limits of judicial review exercised by the Brazilian Supreme Court in contexts of institutional crisis, with particular attention to single-justice rulings, collegiality, and the transition from exceptional action to constitutional normality. It is a theoretical, qualitative, bibliographic, and documentary research based on constitutional scholarship concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, court decision-making design, and deliberative democracy, as well as on the Court’s internal rules and official documents. The objective is to identify criteria capable of distinguishing defensive judicial action aimed at preserving the minimum conditions of democracy from judicial expansion that, when normalized, may reduce political and collegial deliberation. The results indicate that the legitimacy of intensive judicial responses to democratic threats depends on identifiable legal grounds, necessity, proportionality, temporality, public reasoning, and collegial review. Internal Rule Amendment No. 58/2022, which strengthened collegial review of urgent interim measures, and the reduction in single-justice injunctions reported by the Court in 2026 show an institutional movement toward collegiality, without eliminating the debate over individual judicial powers and virtual deliberation. The study concludes that judicial protection of democracy requires both response capacity in critical moments and mechanisms of self-restraint, collegiality, and restoration of institutional normality.