

**FROM TIKTOK TO THE TRIBUNAL OF REASON: *A SINA DE OFÉLIA*, AI VOICE CLONING,
AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE KANTIAN BEAUTIFUL** <https://doi.org/10.63330/aurumpub.064-001>**Divina Mendes Chagas¹****Abstract**

This article analyzes the viral phenomenon of the musical track *A Sina de Ofélia*, produced by artificial intelligence (AI) in December 2025, in light of Immanuel Kant's aesthetics as developed in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Based on a bibliographic review and a case study, it investigates the extent to which a work generated by algorithms challenges the Kantian concepts of judgment of taste, the beautiful, genius, and the sublime. The text also engages with Luciano Floridi's conception of artificial agency, distinguishing artificial intelligence's capacity to produce aesthetic effects from the absence of consciousness, intentionality, and genuine creation. It concludes that, although artificial intelligence systems are capable of reproducing formal patterns, eliciting aesthetic pleasure, and influencing collective taste, they remain incapable of engaging in the free play of the faculties that grounds the Kantian beautiful. In this sense, *A Sina de Ofélia* reveals less the triumph of machine creativity than the emergence of a technological sublime, in which astonishment before the power of algorithms reaffirms the centrality of the human faculty of judgment.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Genius, Immanuel Kant, Judgment of Taste, Technological Sublime.

INTRODUCTION

In December 2025, the Brazilian music scene was affected by the circulation of the track *A Sina de Ofélia*, which reached Spotify's Top 50 Brazil before being removed for copyright infringement. The

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song combined references to Taylor Swift's pop universe with elements of pagode and arrocha, using synthetic voices generated by Artificial Intelligence from well-known artists. More than a legal controversy, the case raises philosophical questions about authorship, creativity, and aesthetic experience: can a work produced by AI be considered art? Can the beautiful and the sublime emerge from algorithmic processes?

This article aims to analyze the impacts of Artificial Intelligence on Kantian aesthetic theory, investigating the extent to which the case of *A Sina de Ofélia* challenges the categories of Judgment of Taste, the Beautiful, and the Sublime developed by Kant in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790). It seeks to examine whether algorithmic production can be associated with the Kantian concept of genius; to assess the presence of disinterestedness and purposiveness without purpose in works generated by AI; and to discuss possible reformulations of the Analytic of the Sublime in light of the automation of creativity.

The research adopts a qualitative and exploratory approach, based on bibliographic review and case study. The methodological path comprises: the collection of data on the circulation and removal of the track; an analysis of paragraphs 1–29 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*; and a confrontation between the empirical data and the Kantian framework, with the aim of understanding the aesthetic status of productions generated by Artificial Intelligence.

METHODOLOGY

This article is characterized as qualitative research of a theoretical-bibliographic nature, developed through conceptual analysis and case study. The central philosophical framework consists of Immanuel Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, especially with regard to the concepts of judgment of taste, the beautiful, genius, and the sublime. As a complementary contribution, Luciano Floridi's conception of artificial agency is employed in order to problematize the role of artificial intelligence in contemporary artistic production.

The case study focuses on the track *A Sina de Ofélia*, produced with the assistance of artificial intelligence systems and widely disseminated on digital platforms in December 2025. The choice of this case is justified by its broad public repercussions and by the way it brings to light issues related to authorship, creativity, aesthetic experience, and the ethical limits of algorithmic artistic production.

The methodological path comprised three stages. First, a bibliographic review of Kantian literature relevant to aesthetics was carried out, with emphasis on the concepts mobilized throughout the argument. Second, information was gathered concerning the circulation of the work, its repercussion on digital platforms, and its subsequent removal due to allegations of copyright infringement, using journalistic sources and public documents. Finally, a philosophical analysis of the case was developed, confronting the empirical elements observed with Kantian aesthetic categories and with Floridi's notion of artificial agency, seeking to understand the extent to which artistic production mediated by artificial intelligence challenges or reaffirms the foundations of Kantian aesthetics.

THE ILLUSION OF GENIUS AND THE MECHANIZATION OF FREE PLAY

In the *Analytic of the Beautiful*, Kant postulates that authentic art is inseparable from genius—the natural and innate talent through which nature gives the rule to art. This understanding is related to the fact that aesthetic judgment is not grounded in objective concepts, as the philosopher states: “the judgment of taste is therefore not a judgment of cognition, a logical judgment, but rather an aesthetic judgment, by which is understood that whose determining ground can only be subjective” (Kant, 2016, p. 99). In this context, genius operates in a state of free play: a spontaneous harmony between imagination, which gathers sensible perceptions, and understanding, which seeks organization, without either concept dominating the other.

In the human mind resides genius, which, in free play, where imagination and understanding are present, produces the Authentic Beautiful. By contrast, in artificial intelligence, what operates is AI code combined with the statistical cross-referencing of data, producing a merely technical form of gratification.

When we confront Kant with *A Sina de Ofélia*, the traditional interpretive structure is challenged. Artificial intelligence—software such as Suno and RVC voice-cloning models²—possesses neither imagination nor understanding. It does not play freely; it calculates. The algorithm analyzes frequency patterns in the voices of Sonza and Dilsinho and distributes them over mathematical matrices that simulate Taylor Swift’s compositional behavior.

This understanding is close to Luciano Floridi’s analysis (2025), according to which artificial intelligence systems constitute a form of artificial agency without intelligence properly so called. Although they are capable of producing concrete effects in the world and performing complex tasks, such systems do not understand the meaning of the actions they carry out. From this perspective, algorithmic musical production does not arise from conscious creative activity, but from the execution of statistical operations over large data sets.

Floridi maintains that artificial intelligence systems are capable of acting, producing effects, and modifying the world without, however, possessing consciousness, cognition, or intentionality (Floridi, 2025, p. 1). This understanding shifts the debate away from the question of a supposed machine intelligence and toward the analysis of its capacity for agency. In the artistic field, this perspective becomes especially relevant, since artificial intelligence systems can produce lyrics, melodies, and vocal performances capable of eliciting aesthetic pleasure in listeners and influencing collective taste. The very case of *A Sina de Ofélia*, which remained among the most listened-to songs on digital platforms, shows that these technologies are capable of producing concrete effects on aesthetic experience and on public behavior. However, such systems do not create from conscious intention, nor do they possess any understanding of the meaning of what they produce. It is precisely this dissociation between the capacity to produce aesthetic effects and the absence of intentionality that makes it urgent to reflect on the ethical, legal, and philosophical limits of the use of artificial intelligence in artistic creation intended for social

² Suno and RVC models: Suno is a generative artificial intelligence system focused on music. RVC refers to open-source artificial intelligence systems that make it possible to convert a spoken or sung voice into the voice of another person or character in real time.

consumption, especially when its production interferes with perceptions of authorship, authenticity, and the aesthetic value of works.

Adding the Kantian perspective, therefore, the track is not the product of genius, but an advanced mechanical imitation. The pleasure the listener feels when hearing it does not arise from the perception of a free human soul expressing itself, but rather from technical astonishment: the intellect recognizes the precision of a simulacrum.

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Kant deepens this discussion by stating that the judgment of taste is not a judgment of cognition, but an aesthetic judgment grounded exclusively in the feeling of pleasure or displeasure provoked by the object (Kant, 2016, p. 189). This means that, in order to judge whether a song is beautiful, the individual does not depend on technical knowledge of composition, harmony, or musical theory. The recognition of beauty does not derive from aesthetic erudition, but from the immediate experience established between subject and object. Thus, even a song ranked among the most played on digital platforms in 2026 may be considered beautiful by some listeners and indifferent by others, without there being any rational argument capable of demonstrating who is “correct.”

This characteristic reveals one of the most original aspects of Kantian aesthetics. Although the judgment of taste is subjective, it does not remain confined to the private sphere. The philosopher maintains that the beautiful awakens a feeling of pleasure whose communicability is presupposed among all human beings (Kant, 2016, p. 191). In stating that something is beautiful, the subject expects, even if implicitly, that others will share this satisfaction. This is a universality without concept, grounded not in objective rules, but in the common structure of human cognitive faculties. It is precisely this claim to universal validity that makes the beautiful a matter of collective interest, for the judgment of taste,

although it arises from individual experience, is always directed toward the possibility of a community of appreciators.

THE COLLAPSE OF DISINTERESTEDNESS AND PURPOSIVENESS WITH A COMMERCIAL PURPOSE

Before addressing disinterestedness, it is useful to understand some particularities of Kant's judgment of taste itself. He writes about the peculiarities of the judgment of taste. It determines its object with regard to the satisfaction that the beauty contained in it provokes in the individual. In judging an object as beautiful, the subject not only expresses a personal feeling, but also manifests a claim to universality, expecting others to share that same aesthetic pleasure, even though such agreement cannot be demonstrated by concepts (Kant, 2016, p. 180).

When formulating an aesthetic judgment, the individual cannot experience another person's experience. The feeling of the beautiful is always lived in a singular manner, for it arises from the direct relation between subject and object. It is one's own experience with the object (Kant, 2016, p. 181).

Kant indicates a second peculiarity in the judgment of taste: it cannot be determined by arguments (Kant, 2016, p. 182), which reinforces its subjective character. When an individual does not judge as beautiful a song that appears among the most played on music applications, there are no logical arguments capable of modifying that perception. What may happen is that the individual begins to question their own tastes based on what they observe in the ranking of most-listened-to songs. The judgment of taste is formulated from one's own experience and not according to universal aesthetic judgments.

This aspect makes the case of *A Sina de Ofélia* especially relevant for Kantian reflection. The fact that the song reached millions of plays and occupied prominent positions on digital platforms does not, by itself, constitute a criterion for affirming its beauty. Popularity measures reach, engagement, and circulation, but it does not replace individual aesthetic experience. In Kant, the beautiful is not determined

by the number of people who appreciate a work, but by the free play between imagination and understanding experienced by each subject.

Digital platforms seem to produce a new form of universality of taste. However, this is a statistical universality, grounded in recommendation algorithms, trends, and consumption metrics, and not the subjective universality defended by Kant. The user may be led to believe that a given work is beautiful because millions of people have listened to it or shared it. Yet this numerical consensus is not equivalent to the consensus intended by Kantian aesthetic judgment. Algorithmic repetition can influence the expectations and predispositions of the public, but it is not capable, by itself, of producing the feeling of the beautiful.

The second Kantian pillar of the Judgment of Taste is disinterestedness. To say that something is beautiful requires a contemplative pleasure, free from private sensory inclinations—the agreeable—or from practical and moral utilities—the good. Moreover, the beautiful object manifests purposiveness without purpose: it appears to carry a perfect order made for our contemplation, although it serves no immediate biological or utilitarian purpose.

A song generated by AI reverses this logic in two central respects:

- a) The aesthetics of interest: The massive engagement with *A Sina de Ofélia*—40,000 creations on TikTok and 6 million views in one week—was indexed to interest. The public did not listen to the track in contemplative isolation, but was motivated by technological astonishment, curiosity regarding the synthetic voices, and the possibility of sharing a viral phenomenon. The very process of perceiving the work is already conditioned by interests external to aesthetic judgment.
- b) Purposiveness with an algorithmic purpose: Far from being a “purposiveness without purpose,” music generated by AI represents the maximum expression of utilitarian purposiveness. It is produced by models trained to maximize retention, engagement, the user’s permanence on the platform, and the circulation of content. This is the aestheticization of

recommendation mechanisms, in which artistic experience comes to serve the economic objectives of algorithms.

Kant distinguishes Free Beauty—arabesques, birds, instrumental music—which pleases purely through form, from Adherent Beauty, which depends on the concept of what the object ought to be, such as a church or a warrior.

“*A Sina de Ofélia*” could never be a Free Beauty. It is a hyperconceptual Adherent Beauty: its judgment depends entirely on the prior concept we have of “how Luísa Sonza should sound” or “how Taylor Swift would structure this melodic bridge.” We judge the track by its capacity to conform to a preexisting standard.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL SUBLIME: THE FAILURE OF IMAGINATION BEFORE DATA

If the track fails to consolidate itself as the purely Kantian Beautiful, it pushes the spectator toward the Analytic of the Sublime. While the beautiful brings serenity and limited form, the sublime deals with awe, conflict, and the absence of limits—the discomfort that is transformed into moral elevation.

What is proposed here is an updating of Kant’s categories for the era of technological synchysis, in the sense of chaotic perception:

In Kant’s Mathematical Sublime, the immensity of the universe cannot be contained by human imagination. The Sublime of Big Data, in turn, presents the perception that AI processed billions of phonetic and cultural data points in seconds and generated a track. Imagination cannot contain the volume of data, but reason understands the concept of hyper-intelligence.

In the Dynamic Sublime, the human physical body is threatened by the overwhelming forces of nature. In the post-human Sublime, there exists an existential terror of the obsolescence of artistic creation, intensified by the artistic production of a machine.

The feeling experienced upon noticing the illusion of the artificial voice on Spotify is not one of immediate pleasure, but of awe mediated by displeasure. It is the shock of perceiving that human identity—the vocal signature of an individual—has become a recombinatory mathematical vector. The original human voice is dissolved into data, and this generates terror. The triumph of reason here, which is astonished, analyzes, and understands what occurs and how it occurs, is the sublime.

There is a Kantian outcome in the very closure of the case. The fall of the song on New Year's Eve 2025, driven by record labels such as Republic Records, demonstrates that although the machine can emulate nature and genius, it still comes up against human juridical and moral reason. The physical nature of code was contained by human agency and by the defense of authorship.

CONCLUSION

The case of *A Sina de Ofélia* shows that the development of Artificial Intelligence challenges not only the music market or Copyright Law, but also places under tension fundamental categories of the philosophy of art. By confronting this phenomenon with the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, it was observed that Kantian aesthetics continues to offer consistent conceptual tools for understanding contemporary aesthetic experience. The judgment of taste, the concept of genius, the beautiful, and the sublime remain fruitful precisely because they allow us to distinguish technical sophistication from effective aesthetic experience.

Throughout this article, the aim was to demonstrate that algorithmic production cannot be identified with Kantian genius. Although artificial intelligence is capable of recombining styles, timbres, and musical structures with a high degree of precision, its operation remains tied to the statistical processing of data and not to the free play between imagination and understanding described by Kant. Likewise, it was shown that the logic of digital platforms displaces aesthetic experience from disinterestedness toward a dynamic of algorithmic interest, oriented by metrics of engagement, retention, and content circulation. In this scenario, the success of a work no longer derives exclusively from the

contemplation of beauty, but comes to be influenced by technical mechanisms of recommendation and viralization.

However, perhaps it is precisely in this displacement that the greatest philosophical contribution of the case analyzed resides. If artificial intelligence weakens some presuppositions of Kantian aesthetics, it also makes evident the persistence of others. The algorithm can reproduce forms, voices, and styles, but it remains incapable of experiencing aesthetic pleasure or formulating a judgment of taste. The faculty of judgment continues to belong to the human subject, whose aesthetic experience cannot be replaced by computational calculation. In this sense, the rise of AI-generated productions does not eliminate the need for human judgment; on the contrary, it makes it even more indispensable in the face of the growing difficulty of distinguishing creation, reproduction, and simulation.

Thus, *A Sina de Ofélia* reveals itself less as a definitive rupture with Kantian aesthetics than as an opportunity for its critical renewal. The work demonstrates that technique can automate creative procedures, formally approximate the beautiful, and produce an intense feeling of awe before computational power. Nevertheless, it remains the human being who attributes meaning, recognizes beauty, experiences the sublime, and exercises the judgment of taste. Perhaps this is Kant's principal legacy for the age of artificial intelligence: to remind us that, even when artistic creation appears to shift toward machines, aesthetic experience continues to find its foundation in the subject's reflective freedom.

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